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Previous research into uncertain and risky decision-making in autism spectrum disorder
(ASD) has been inconclusive, with some studies reporting less uncertain and risky
decisions by persons with ASD compared to neurotypicals, but other studies failing to
find such effects. A possible explanation for these inconsistent findings is that aberrant
decision-making in ASD is domain-specific, and only manifests itself in domains related
to autism symptomatology. The present study examines this premise by correlating
self-reported autistic traits to individuals’ intention to engage in risky behaviours, their
perception of how risky these behaviours are, and the amount of benefit they expect
to obtain from engaging in them; all for five separate domains of decision-making:
social, ethical, recreational, health/safety, and financial. In line with the hypotheses,
persons with higher autistic traits reported reduced intention to engage in risky social
behaviours and increased intention to engage in risky ethical behaviours. Furthermore,
a positive correlation was found between autistic traits and risk perception in the social
domain, indicating that persons with higher autistic traits perceive social behaviours
as riskier than do persons with lower autistic traits. Correlations between autistic traits
and individuals’ intention to engage in risky recreational and financial behaviours were
small, and supported the null hypothesis (as shown by Bayes Factors). Given that
most studies on uncertain and risky decision-making take place in a financial context,
the present results could explain previous inconsistent findings on decision-making
in ASD. Therefore, future studies should also examine decision-making outside the
financial realm.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, Autism-Spectrum Quotient, Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale,
uncertainty, risk
INTRODUCTION
Decision-making is a key process that can have major consequences for personal and professional
life. Hence, research into individuals’ decision processes not only contributes to our understanding
of human cognition, but can also have considerable practical implications. In addition to
studying decision-making in typical populations, some investigations focus on clinical ones.
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One such group concerns individuals with autism spectrum
disorder (ASD), a neurodevelopmental syndrome characterised
by difficulties in social communication, restricted and repetitive
behaviour, a preference for sameness and routines, and
sensory abnormalities (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Examining decision-making in persons with ASD may identify
situations in which their decision-making is impeded, as well
as situations in which their decisions outperform those of
‘neurotypical’ individuals.
For most decisions we make, it is unclear what the exact
outcome will be. Many situations are therefore characterised
by risk (where we know the probabilities associated with
the outcomes) or uncertainty (where these probabilities are
unknown) (Knight, 1921). Research into such uncertain or risky
decision-making in ASD has so far been inconclusive. For
example, some studies show that individuals with ASD make less
uncertain and/or risky decisions (De Martino et al., 2008; South
et al., 2014; Levin et al., 2015), whereas others fail to find such
differences between individuals with and without ASD (Johnson
et al., 2006; South et al., 2008, 2011).
A possible explanation of these conflicting findings is that
aberrant decision-making in ASD is domain-specific. Levin et al.
(2015) suggest that especially social uncertainty/risk may be
salient for persons with ASD, and that it would therefore be
useful to examine domains separately. This premise fits with
autism symptomatology: given that persons with ASD show
difficulties in social interaction and communication (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013), it is reasonable to expect aberrant
decision-making in the social domain. In contrast, autism
symptomatology does not suggest that aberrant decision-making
is likely to occur in, for instance, the financial domain. Since
most studies examining uncertain and risky decisions employ
financial incentives (Johnson et al., 2006; De Martino et al., 2008;
South et al., 2008, 2011, 2014; Levin et al., 2015), this may explain
the lack of consistent findings on decision-making in individuals
with ASD.
To address the premise that decision-making in ASD only
differs from neurotypical decision-making in a subset of domains,
Levin et al. (2015) suggest using the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking
(DOSPERT) scale, a self-report measure that assesses risky1
decision-making across five domains: social, ethical, recreational,
health/safety, and financial (Blais and Weber, 2006). To the
knowledge of the author, so far only one study has used
the DOSPERT scale in relation to ASD. Gaeth et al. (2016)
found that individuals with ASD reported reduced intention
to engage in risky social behaviours and increased intention to
engage in risky ethical behaviours, compared to a control group.
No differences were observed for any of the other domains,
1The DOSPERT scale is presented as measuring intentions, perceptions, and
expectations regarding risky behaviours (Blais and Weber, 2006). However, a
recent article (De Groot and Thurik, 2018) makes the case that the behaviours
included in the scale are characterised by uncertainty rather than risk, since the
probabilities associated with the outcomes of the behaviours are unknown (Knight,
1921). In the present article, the term ‘risk’ is used in relation to (findings based
on) the DOSPERT scale, in order to stay true to the original literature, and to
prevent confusion among readers already familiar with the scale. Nevertheless,
readers should bear in mind that participants’ answers are given under conditions
of uncertainty.
supporting the premise that aberrant decision-making in ASD is
domain-specific.
The present study extends the findings by Gaeth et al. (2016)
in two ways. First, it aims to replicate the findings in the
broader autism spectrum, that is, along a continuum ranging
from individuals who report few autistic traits to individuals
who report many (Wing, 1988; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
Previous research on this broader spectrum has demonstrated
that clinical characteristics are (to a lesser extent) also observed
in the general population (De Groot and Van Strien, 2017). The
present study examines whether this holds for risk-taking too.
Second, Gaeth et al.’s (2016) findings are extended by including
not one but all three DOSPERT scales. In addition to the scale
examining individuals’ intention of engaging in risky behaviours
(risk-taking), the DOSPERT includes two additional scales: one
asking individuals how risky they think each behaviour is (risk
perception), and one asking them how much benefit they think
they would obtain from engaging in it (expected benefit). Data
from these two additional scales may clarify why individuals show
certain levels of risk-taking on the first scale.
Specifically, the present study examines the correlations
between autistic traits and individuals’ (1) risk-taking, (2) risk
perception, and (3) expected benefit for activities/behaviours
in five separate decision domains: social, ethical, recreational,
health/safety, and financial. Based on Gaeth et al.’s (2016)
findings, it is hypothesised that autistic traits correlate negatively
with the intention to engage in risky social behaviours, and
positively with the intention to engage in risky ethical behaviours.
Furthermore, it is expected that individuals’ intention to take
risks in other domains is not correlated with autistic traits. Since
the former hypotheses favour H1 and the latter favour H0, Bayes
Factors are computed in order to quantify evidence for both
H1 and H0 (Wagenmakers et al., 2016; Quintana and Williams,
2018). Given the lack of research on risk perception and expected
benefit in relation to ASD, no hypotheses are formulated for
these constructs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The participants were 240 students. The sample was
approximately gender-balanced, consisting of 113 male
and 127 female participants with a mean age of M = 20.88
(SD = 3.32), range 17–55 years. Most participants were studying
social sciences (53.33%), management (17.08%), or economics
(15.83%). The study was in accordance with the Helsinki
declaration, and received ethics approval from the Erasmus
Research Institute of Management (ERIM) review board. All
participants provided written informed consent.
Measures
Autism-Spectrum Quotient
The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)
is a self-report measure of autistic traits in adults of normal
intelligence, and consists of 50 items that are answered on a 4-
point Likert-scale. Contrary to Baron-Cohen et al. (2001), all four
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answer options were included in scoring as this provides better
results on psychometric indices (Murray et al., 2016; Stevenson
and Hart, 2017). Cronbach’s alpha was α = 0.82.
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale
The full DOSPERT scale (Blais and Weber, 2006) consists of
three scales that each contain the same 30 items, divided into five
subscales: social, ethical, recreational, health/safety, and financial.
Each item describes a risky activity/behaviour, such as disagreeing
with an authority figure (social), leaving your children alone
while running an errand (ethical), or betting one’s income in
sports (financial). On scale one, individuals rate their likelihood
of engaging in each risky behaviour (risk-taking); on scale two,
they rate their gut level assessment of the riskiness of each
behaviour (risk perception); and on scale three, they rate how
much benefit they think they would obtain from engaging in each
behaviour (expected benefit). All items are answered on a 7-point
Likert-scale. Cronbach’s alpha for the three composite scales was
α = 0.88, α = 0.86, and α = 0.85, respectively; and α = 0.66–0.85,
α = 0.72–0.87, and α = 0.51–0.89 for the subscales.
Procedure
The data were collected as part of two separate studies
(n = 124 and n = 116) on decision-making under uncertain and
risky conditions. The questionnaires were filled out online by
participants, who were urged to do so in a quiet environment.
Analyses
First, the possibility of Common Method Bias (CMB) was
examined because all measures used in the present study are of
the same type (self-report). To this end, one (unrotated) factor
was extracted from a principal component analysis in order to
examine how much variance that one factor explained. Second,
possible Insufficient Effort Responding (IER) was examined
by checking response times (RTs) under the assumption that
short RTs indicate limited cognitive processing (Huang et al.,
2012). Third, descriptive statistics for the AQ and the three
DOSPERT scales were computed. Fourth, the hypotheses were
tested by correlating the AQ score with the first, second, and
third DOSPERT scale (risk-taking, risk perception, and expected
benefit, respectively). Because some predictions favoured H0,
frequentist statistics were deemed unsuitable, and Bayes Factors
(BFs) rather than p-values were reported.2
2The assertion that frequentist statistics can only reject and not support H0, is
actually flawed. In frequentist statistics, the p-value of a hypothesis can indeed
only reject the null hypothesis. In other words, the p-value of H0 cannot accept
H0. However, H0 does not need to be zero. Defining H0 as an effect ‘big enough to
be of interest’, one can reject the null that an effect is big enough to be of interest,
and thus conclude that the effect is nearly zero (Hodges and Lehmann, 1954;
Cohen, 1988; Rindskopf, 1997). The H1 then states that the effect (for example,
the correlation) between X and Y is very small (negligible). The H0 then states
that the effect is large enough to be deemed important. Now the H0 and H1 are
‘composite’ hypotheses (both consisting of a range of possible values) rather than
‘point’ hypotheses (single values). This way, one could for example test the H1 that
the correlation between X and Y is less than r = 0.05 (very small) against the H0
that the correlation is at least r = 0.05 by asking whether H1 (r < 0.05) lies in the
confidence interval (CI) and H0 (r ≥ 0.05) lies outside of it. If the CI includes
the negligible effect and excludes all values big enough to be of interest, one can
accept the null. With this approach, the present study could have used frequentist
statistics, though using BFs is more straightforward here.
BFs are an implementation of Bayesian hypothesis testing,
and quantify the degree to which data favour H1, H0, or neither
hypothesis (Wagenmakers et al., 2016; Quintana and Williams,
2018). It is a relative measure that compares the predictive
accuracy of the two models. BFs can thus indicate that data are
more likely to have occurred under one model than another, but
do not specify the absolute performance of a model. Therefore,
it is still valuable to report the absolute correlation size, with
Pearson’s r = 0.10 indicating a small, 0.30 indicating a medium,
and 0.50 indicating a large effect (Cohen, 1992). BFs were
interpreted using the classification of Jeffreys (1961) as adjusted
by Lee and Wagenmakers (2013), and were computed with
the open-source software program JASP (JASP Team, 2018).
Computing BFs requires specifying a prior distribution, which is
based on prior knowledge (often from previous studies) about
the parameters of the model. Given the scarcity of previous
research on the topic examined here, the JASP default (a stretched
beta prior width of 1) was used, which only limits ρ to values
between −1 and +1. The impact of the prior on the results
was examined in a robustness check. A second robustness check
examined the impact of excluding participants with psychiatric
or neurological disorders. A third robustness check examined
the impact of conceptual overlap between items from the AQ
and the DOSPERT.
RESULTS
Common Method Bias
All items were loaded into a principal component analysis from
which one factor was extracted. This was done for the AQ items
together with those of each of the DOSPERT scales. A single
factor explained 11.02% of variance for the AQ and risk-taking
items, 9.66% for the AQ and risk perception items, and 9.24% for
the AQ and expected benefit items. Since the single factor could
not account for a majority of variance, it was concluded that CMB
was not an issue.
Insufficient Effort Responding
Response times were available for one of the subsamples
(n = 116). Since the survey allowed participants to temporarily
abandon and later return to filling out the questions, a few
extreme RTs of several hours were observed, which heavily
impacted the mean and SD. Therefore, RTs ≥ 60 min were
discarded, leaving n = 111. The average RT of this trimmed
sample was M = 16.86 (SD = 8.37), range 5.62–54.72 min. Six
participants scored ≥1 SD below the mean. Inspection of their
data did not reveal any signs of IER: none had odd response
patterns, and their average scores on the 19 study variables only
significantly differed from those of the other participants once
(which can be expected based on a 5% chance level).
Descriptive Statistics
The average AQ score was M = 108.42 (SD = 13.33, range
71–156). The DOSPERT average total scores were M = 107.30
(SD = 24.04, range 50–162) for risk-taking, M = 127.58
(SD = 21.27, range 73–183) for risk perception, and M = 100.43
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(SD = 20.33, range 47–165) for expected benefit. Independent
t-tests showed that men scored higher than women on
autistic traits [t(238) = 2.47, p = 0.014, η2p = 0.02], risk-taking
[t(238) = 6.19, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.14], and expected benefit
[t(238) = 3.62, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.05]. Women scored higher than
men on risk perception [t(238) =−4.86, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.09].
Visual inspection of the histograms and normal Q–Q plots
indicated that all full scales were approximately normally
distributed. This was supported by quantitative distribution
indices: skewness was 0.02 for autistic traits, −0.03 for risk-
taking, −0.04 for risk perception, and −0.23 for expected benefit
(SE = 0.16); kurtosis was 0.53 for autistic traits, −0.44 for risk-
taking, −0.16 for risk perception, and 0.10 for expected benefit
(SE = 0.31). Four DOSPERT subscales were skewed: ethical and
financial risk-taking, and health/safety expected benefit were
right skewed; financial risk perception was left skewed. Inspection
of suspected outliers showed that these resulted from persons
having one or more extreme but plausible subscale scores.
Therefore, all participants were retained in the analyses.
Correlation Analyses
The correlations between autistic traits (AQ) and the three
DOSPERT scales are presented in Table 1 for each subscale of
the DOSPERT separately.
TABLE 1 | Correlations between autistic traits (AQ) and the three DOSPERT
scales for each subscale of the DOSPERT separately.
Correlation
AQ, DOSPERT
risk-taking
AQ, DOSPERT
risk
perception
AQ, DOSPERT
expected
benefit
DOSPERT subscale
Social r −0.29 0.32 −0.05
BF10 3696.05 28726.13 0.11
Ethical r 0.22 −0.06 0.12
BF10 34.94 0.13 0.51
Financial r 0.08 −0.03 0.08
BF01 6.18 11.38 5.38
Recreational r −0.06 −0.02 −0.03
BF01 7.91 11.83 11.44
Health/safety r −0.12 −0.08 0.04
BF01 2.00 5.98 9.92
Total r −0.04 0.03 0.06
BF01 9.89 11.19 7.90
Bayes Factors are a relative measure and provide a ratio between the likelihood
of the null and that of the alternative model. This ratio can be reported as BF10
(evidence for H1 relative to H0) or BF01 (evidence for H0 relative to H1), which are
each other’s inverse: BF10 = 1/BF01. Since previous research (Gaeth et al., 2016)
reported effects in the social and ethical domain, for these domains BF10 was
reported. Since the hypotheses predicted no effects for the other domains, BF01
was used for those. BFs were interpreted using the classification of Jeffreys (1961)
as adjusted by Lee and Wagenmakers (2013), in which BF10 = 1–3 (BF01 = 1/3−1)
is considered anecdotal evidence; BF10 = 3–10 (BF01 = 1/10−1/3) moderate
evidence; BF10 = 10–30 (BF01 = 1/30−1/10) strong evidence; BF10 = 30–100
(BF01 = 1/100−1/30) very strong evidence; and BF10 > 100 (BF01 < 1/100)
extreme evidence.
As hypothesised, autistic traits were negatively correlated
with individuals’ intention to engage in risky social behaviours
(r = −0.29) and positively with their intention to engage
in risky ethical behaviours (r = 0.22). The BFs indicated
that the evidence in support of H1 was ‘extreme’ for social
behaviours and ‘very strong’ for ethical ones, with the data
being respectively almost 3700 and 35 times more likely
to have occurred under H1 than H0. For the financial,
recreational, and full score, correlations were small (0.08, −0.06,
and −0.04, respectively), and the BFs indicated ‘moderate’
evidence for H0. Evidence for the health/safety domain was
‘anecdotal’ (r = −0.12, BF01 = 2.00), hence supporting
neither hypothesis.
Regarding the correlations between autistic traits and risk
perception, the data again showed ‘extreme evidence’ for H1 in
the social domain, with individuals with higher autistic traits
judging social behaviours as riskier (r = 0.32, BF10 = 28726.13).
The correlations between autistic traits and the other domains
plus the full score were smaller (−0.06, −0.03, −0.02, −0.08,
0.03), and their accompanying BFs provided support for H0
that was of either ‘moderate’ (ethical, health/safety) or ‘strong’
(financial, recreational, full score) magnitude.
Finally, for the expected benefit scale, none of the correlations
favoured the H1. For the recreational subscale (r = −0.03)
the BF provided ‘strong’ evidence for H0. The H0 received
‘moderate’ evidence for the social, financial, health/safety,
and full score (correlations −0.05, 0.08, 0.04, and 0.06,
respectively), and ‘anecdotal’ evidence for the ethical subscale
(r = 0.12).
Robustness Analyses
Three robustness checks were run. The exact findings
of these robustness analyses are reported in the
Supplementary Material.
First, given the sensitivity of BFs to the prior (Kass and
Raftery, 1995), the impact of assigning different priors was
examined. BFs were examined for prior widths ranging from
approximately 0.25 to 2 (disregarding widths around 0, given
that they are unrealistically small and almost always result
in a BF of 1). Across this range, over half of the BFs
changed from moderate to strong magnitude, or vice versa.
This was to be expected, given that many of the initial BFs fell
around this interpretation line (BF10 = 10 or BF01 = 1/10).
Because of this, some of the other BFs also moved one
classification category up or down. Overall, none of the main
conclusions changed.
A second robustness check examined the impact of excluding
participants with a current psychiatric or neurological disorder.
Given the present focus on traits that are assumed to exist on
a population-wide spectrum, these individuals were included in
the main analyses since they are also assumed to be on that
spectrum. However, since psychiatric or neurological disorders
may impact a person’s autistic trait level, the results were
examined after excluding these individuals. Based on self-
reported diagnosis, 15 participants were excluded (one of whom
reported ASD). No major changes in the correlation coefficients
or the BFs were observed.
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A third robustness check examined the impact of
conceptual overlap between items from the AQ and the
DOSPERT. In the main analyses, the full AQ score was
used since previous literature did not allow for more
specific hypotheses (focused on subsets of autistic traits).
However, it is possible that the correlations between the
AQ and the DOSPERT social scores were inflated as a
result of conceptual overlap between these DOSPERT
items and AQ items focused on the social characteristics
of autism. Re-running the analyses using an AQ score
based on only 40 items (disregarding the 10 items
from the AQ ‘social skill’ subset) indeed lowered the
correlations and accompanying BFs for the social subscale
of both risk-taking and risk perception. However, the
correlations remained of moderate size (from r = −0.29
to r = −0.25; and from r = 0.32 to r = 0.29), and
the BFs still provided ‘extreme’ evidence for H1 (from
BF10 = 3696.05 to BF10 = 134.72; and from BF10 = 28726.13 to
BF10 = 2647.94).
DISCUSSION
The present study examined the correlations between autistic
traits and individuals’ intention of engaging in risky behaviours,
their perception of how risky these behaviours are, and the
amount of benefit they expect to obtain from engaging in
these behaviours. Correlations were examined for behaviours
in five separate domains of decision-making, of which (based
on previous work) especially the social, ethical, and financial
domain were of interest to the present study. In line with the
hypotheses, individuals scoring higher on autistic traits reported
a lower intention to engage in risky social behaviours and a higher
intention to engage in risky ethical behaviours. Bayes Factors
indicated that for both correlations the data favoured the H1
over the H0. In contrast, the correlation between autistic traits
and the intention to engage in risky financial behaviours was
small, and favoured the H0. Most correlations between autistic
traits and the other two DOSPERT scales (risk perception and
expected benefit) were also small, and again favoured the H0.
A notable exception was the positive correlation between autistic
traits and social risk perception, for which the data were better
explained by the H1.
For the social domain, both the reduced risk-taking and the
increased risk perception may be explained by social motivation
theory (Chevallier et al., 2012). If individuals with higher autistic
traits find social activities less rewarding, they may be less inclined
to engage in such activities (resulting in decreased social risk-
taking). Since they then gain less experience with these activities,
they may become more wary of them (hence increased perception
of risks). An alternative explanation can be found within the
DOSPERT framework itself, as the positive correlation between
autistic traits and the second DOSPERT scale (risk perception)
could explain the negative correlation between autistic traits and
the first DOSPERT scale (risk-taking): individuals with higher
autistic traits might engage less in risky social behaviours because
they perceive such behaviours as riskier than do individuals
with lower autistic traits. This premise was supported by an ex
post mediation analysis showing that for the social domain, risk
perception indeed mediated the relationship between AQ and
risk-taking [β = −0.09, SE = 0.03, CI (−0.15, −0.04)]. Thus,
the relationship between individuals’ autistic traits and their
intention to engage in risky social behaviours can in part be
explained by how they perceive these risks.
In contrast to the social domain, the positive correlation
between autistic traits and the intention to engage in risky ethical
behaviours could not be explained by data from the additional
DOSPERT scales, since these latter correlations favoured the H0.
Alternatively, this positive correlation may be explained by the
assertion that individuals with higher autistic traits incorporate
less emotional information in their decision-making and hence
make more rational decisions, as demonstrated by their reduced
sensitivity to framing effects (Shah et al., 2016), composition
effects (Farmer et al., 2017), and ownership effects (Hartley and
Fisher, 2018). This may especially impact decisions in the ethical
domain, since one’s emotional response towards a situation is
thought to influence judgement of the ethical acceptability of
that situation (Brewer et al., 2015). This more rational decision
style could explain the increased intention of individuals with
high autistic traits to engage in risky ethical behaviours, despite
not perceiving these behaviours as less risky or as yielding more
benefit. It also fits with findings on moral decision-making by
individuals with autism, who more frequently opt for utilitarian
decisions in personal moral dilemmas than neurotypicals do
(Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013). Presented with such dilemmas,
they show reduced emotional reactions, despite having similar
perceptions of the appropriateness of the judgements. Moreover,
individuals with autism who make utilitarian choices show a
decreased ability to infer other people’s intentions and to take
their perspective. Hence, making more rational ethical decisions
may also result from poorer cognitive empathy.
Finally, an explanation for the null findings in the financial
domain has already been proposed in the introduction, where
it was argued that autism symptomatology is not indicative of
aberrant financial risk-taking, and that studies solely focusing
on the financial domain may therefore not find a consistent
relationship between risk-taking and autistic traits. Together
with Gaeth et al.’s (2016) findings in individuals with clinically
diagnosed ASD, the present study supports this premise, and
stresses the importance of examining decision-making in non-
financial domains. In addition to self-report scales like the
DOSPERT, the feasibility of this recommendation has been
shown for behavioural risk tasks, which have sparsely but
successfully been used with non-financial incentives, such
as social rewards (Op de Macks et al., 2017). Other tasks,
like the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, the Dictator Game, and
the Ultimatum Game, also incorporate social elements in
the decision process, and have been shown to work well
in relation to autism (see e.g. Sally and Hill, 2006). Future
studies should follow-up on that and look beyond financial
decision-making, especially when examining clinical groups
or associated traits for which aberrant financial decisions
are not naturally expected based on existing knowledge of
their symptomatology.
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